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Clinical Trials and the Reorganization of Medical
Research in post-Second World War Britain
HELEN VALIER and CARSTEN TIMMERMANN*
The rise of biomedicine is usually associated with the transformation of biological
and medical research in the United States following the vast expansion of funding,
both private and public, in the years after the Second World War.
1 Along with the other
authors in this issue, we are interested in describing this phenomenon in national con-
texts other than the United States. Our discussion of biomedicine in Britain draws
upon many of the same themes as our fellow authors and the existing literature on the
US—the new role of the state as scientific entrepreneur; the relationship between experi-
mental medicine and clinical services; and the growing institutionalization of associa-
tions between laboratory and clinic—to emphasize the clinical trial as a privileged
form of therapeutic evaluation in the post-war years. In particular we are keen to stress
that the randomized clinical, or controlled, trial (RCT) in Britain developed within a
period of increasing centralization of state policy and planning for health services and
medical research.
The epistemological success of the RCT in demonstrating the value of the anti-
tuberculosis drug streptomycin elevated the technique to international prominence in
the late 1940s. The 1948 trials of streptomycin conducted by the British Medical
Research Council (MRC), along with similar trials in the United States, are usually
recognized as the world’s first randomized controlled trials. Indeed, the streptomycin
trials, and the trials of PAS and isoniazid that followed in the early 1950s, did combine
the statistical technique of randomization, with new organizational techniques, such as
the division of specialist labour, and central review and data collection, across multiple
sites of study. As Peter Keating and Alberto Cambrosio, Ilana Lo ¨wy, and Harry Marks
have shown for the US, the success of the co-operative (that is, multi-centre) clinical
trial was intimately related to the new role of the federal government, through
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493the National Institutes of Health, in funding such organized biomedical research.
2
Similarly, using treatment trials for tuberculosis and lung cancer as our case studies,
we show for Britain that the promotion and organization of co-operative trials was
fundamentally part of the MRC’s new role within the state. We argue that the Council
pursued the trials as a means of unifying a research landscape that was characterized
by localism and suspicions about MRC plans to remodel clinical research to resemble
the basic sciences.
We argue further that a controlled trial must be understood both as a tool to produce
knowledge persuasive enough to direct best clinical practice, and as a powerful means
to discipline research workers in disparate settings.
3 Neither process was particularly
straightforward. It took years of clinical trials of anti-tuberculosis chemotherapies before
sanatorium treatment and bed-rest were entirely given up by British physicians. The
MRC’s 1955 trials carried out in the Indian city of Madras (Chennai) are generally
regarded as conclusively showing domiciliary care to be redundant in the presence of
chemotherapeutic intervention; however, we argue that trials influenced but did not
change practice overnight. Similarly, the lung cancer trials initiated by the MRC follow-
ing a conference in 1957 as part of a broader programme of therapy trials for various
types of cancer, proved difficult to run. Furthermore, they did not resolve the controversy
as intended, not least because procedures and treatment pathways were well established
before the trials. Serious historical attention to the organizational details, reception of
such RCTs, and resulting changes in practice, is needed if we are not to be blinded by
hindsight. Before we turn to the trials, however, we need to discuss the role of the
MRC in the history of biomedicine in Britain and the place of the Council within the
post-war socialized National Health Service (NHS).
The MRC and Biomedical Research in Britain
As Keating and Cambrosio have noted, the term “biomedicine”, according to the
Oxford English Dictionary, first appeared in the twelfth edition of the American publica-
tion, Dorland’s Medical Dictionary, published in 1923.
4 Biomedicine, according to this
definition, was “clinical medicine based on the principles of physiology and
biochemistry”. This resonated strongly with the priorities for medical research as out-
lined by the contemporary leadership of the British MRC, created as the Medical
Research Committee under the 1911 National Insurance Act.
5 During the Great War,
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screening to clinical research: the cure of leukemia
and the early development of the cooperative
oncology groups, 1955–1966’, Bull. Hist. Med., 2002,
76: 299–334; Ilana Lo ¨wy, Between bench and
bedside: science, healing, and interleukin-2 in a
cancer ward, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press, 1996, ch. 1; Harry M Marks, The progress of
experiment: science and therapeutic reform in the
United States, 1900–1990, New York, Cambridge
University Press, 1997.
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Rodopi, 2007.
4Keating and Cambrosio, op. cit., note 1 above,
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the post-war period was sporadic and not common in
the medical literature.
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494Britain’s Liberal prime minister, Lloyd George, promised a new government ministry
dedicated to promoting a healthier British public, and indeed a Ministry of Health was
founded in 1919. With the support of Christopher Addison, a former professor of anat-
omy and the head of the newly founded ministry, the Medical Research Committee
was reformulated in 1919 to become the Medical Research Council, commanding a
substantially increased budget. Walter Fletcher, a Cambridge-trained physiologist and
first Secretary of the MRC, had skilfully exploited opportunities to become more closely
involved in state affairs during and after the war, and through doing so successfully
transformed the nascent organization from a narrowly focused, tightly controlled, disease
specific research committee to a broadly defined, ambitious research organization with a
great deal of autonomy in its own affairs.
6 Under Fletcher’s direction the Council’s
attention broadened to encompass a wide range of diseases and medical conditions,
and the seemingly (to Fletcher) more promising pastures of basic, “pure” biomedical
research.
7 Such a shift was enshrined in the concordat drawn up in 1924 directing the
Ministry of Health to concern itself with epidemiological field research (mostly public
health and community matters) and “applied research” on clinical problems, while the
MRC was to initiate and organize all new research in the basic and biomedical sciences.
8
Clinicians were not well represented on the Medical Research Council during the 1920s
and 1930s; Fletcher famously believed that bench scientists—be they bacteriologists, vir-
ologists, immunologists, biochemists, pathologists or physiologists—were the most
appropriate guardians of basic medical and clinical research; an assumption vigorously
challenged by his opponents.
9
The basic medical sciences were certainly rising in prestige in the 1920s. The devel-
opment of salvarsan to treat syphilis; new analgesics for surgery; “biologicals” (like
hormones and vitamins), including treatments for deficiency diseases such as diabetes
(insulin) and pernicious anaemia (extracts of liver)—all demonstrated how apparently
intractable clinical problems could be manipulated and at least partially solved within
the laboratory. This new pharmacopoeia encouraged a new relationship between the
state, pharmaceutical companies, and clinics intent on developing patient trials.
10
Multi-centre, controlled, trials thus began to emerge onto the international clinical
research scene during the 1920s and 1930s. While the MRC funded a statistical research
unit under Major Greenwood, a disciple of Karl Pearson and friend of Fletcher, the use of
predecessor, the Medical Research Committee,
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the Medical Research Council, 12 February, 1924’,
UK National Archives (hereafter NA), MH 123/498.
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495statistical methods for experimental design and data analysis remained somewhat
limited.
11 Sophisticated methods of statistical experimental design and data analysis
were developed in the inter-war period, but were not generally implemented until after
the Second World War. The work of the British biologist and statistician R A Fisher
on randomization and variance analysis, for instance, published as Statistical methods
for research workers (1925) and The design of experiments (1935), was only slowly
accepted but, nevertheless, influenced a generation of post-Second World War biomedi-
cal researchers. One reason for this shift, in Britain at least, was that the new system of
state medicine introduced in 1948 created conditions favouring proposals to make med-
icine more rational and efficient.
During the early twentieth century, the MRC had provided a new institutional home
for the basic and paramedical sciences of physiology, biochemistry and pharmacology
in the National Institute for Medical Research, founded in 1914. The Council was, how-
ever, much less successful in implementing academic clinical research in the so-called
“professorial” units (first in London and later in the provinces), staffed by full-time clin-
icians with strong research backgrounds. Indeed, the efforts of Fletcher and his successor
Edward Mellanby to establish British academic clinical research on a firm footing
experienced mixed fortunes in inter-war Britain.
12 Thus despite MRC attempts to estab-
lish a new independent biomedical research institute and to fund professorial units, Brit-
ish clinical research continued in large part to be funded through local, piecemeal efforts.
Those wishing to conduct medical research applied for grants from a wide range of cha-
rities, hospital endowment funds, universities and the MRC. They then negotiated access
to clinical facilities through individual hospital authorities. The legacy of such arrange-
ments posed a considerable logistical problem for any scheme seeking to centralize
and standardize health policy. After the Second World War, changes to hospital funding
brought about by the implementation of the National Health Service (NHS) Act in 1948
had profound effects on this culture of localism in clinical research.
13
11For problems facing early co-operative trial
groups, see Harry M Marks, ‘Notes from the
underground: the social organization of therapeutic
research’, in Russell C Maulitz and Diana E Long
(eds), Grand rounds: one hundred years of internal
medicine, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1988, pp. 297–336; and on the influence of
Pearson and Greenwood, Eileen Magnello, ‘The
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and Austin Bradford Hill’, in Eileen Magnello and
Anne Hardy (eds), The road to medical statistics,
Amsterdam and New York, Rodopi, 2002, pp.
94–124.
12Apart from the conspicuous successes of the
Rockefeller-funded University College Hospital
(London) unit established under Thomas Lewis, the
inter-war professorial unit system generally proved to
be an inadequate basis on which to produce a strong
British tradition in academic clinical research. Over
the years, despite much discussion and attempts to
ignite wider interest in the unit system, the units
themselves remained mostly clustered in London
teaching hospitals, becoming progressively more
over-burdened with teaching duties. See Christopher
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University of Manchester, 2002.
13For an overview of the origins and development
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Health Service: a political history, Oxford University
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496Throughout the inter-war period, the Ministry had increasing relied on the advice
of the MRC about how best to conduct and appropriately direct its own efforts, while
leaving the Council largely to its own devices.
14 During the late 1930s, the Ministry
devised a plan for a nationwide organization of Emergency Medical Services, to be
put into operation in the event that Britain would go to war.
15 In drawing up the plans,
the government sought advice from the MRC on topics of national defence, notably on
how best to protect the public in the aftermath of an attack with biological weapons.
16
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the Ministry inaugurated the Emergency Pub-
lic Health Laboratory Service, a network linking (mostly university) clinical laboratories
nationwide, for which numerous MRC subcommittees were given executive operational
responsibilities.
17 Thus in 1948, when the activities and resources of the nation’s hospi-
tals passed to the control of the Ministry of Health,
18 there seemed little doubt that the
MRC would play a significant role in the national organization of research.
The final wording of the National Health Service Act had been settled only after often
bitter negotiations between government planners, especially Aneurin Bevan, the chief
architect of the NHS, and the medical professional bodies, notably the Royal Colleges.
Interference with professional traditions and autonomy had been at the heart of many
of these disputes, and the prospect of the Ministry (or the MRC) delving into the research
activities of individual hospitals was controversial. Arthur Landsborough Thomson, a
leading member of the MRC executive, made it clear in private correspondence that
the Council had no wish to meddle with “low-level” research “consisting mainly in the
observation of cases and the trial of methods, that they [clinicians] can take in their stride
while treating patients”.
19 He did, however, indicate that the Council expected to extend
its domain to the overall direction of British medical research, and to do so without pan-
dering to the whims of individual institutions and clinicians, no matter how powerful and
well endowed.
20
The creation of more than fifty new full-time chairs in clinical subjects between 1947
and 1952 substantially increased Britain’s clinical research infrastructure.
21 One reason
for this change was the reorganization of the universities. The new University Grants
Committee (UGC), funded directly from the Treasury, induced essentially private, auton-
omous institutions to become part of a national university system. The NHS brought this
system into a closer relationship with teaching hospitals and medical schools. The Inter-
departmental Committee on Medical Schools (Goodenough Committee) set up by the
14See comments in ‘Medical research at
hospitals in the National Health Service:
Transfer of major schemes to Medical
Research Council, 1949–1953’, NA,
MH 123/498.
15On the founding of the Emergency
Medical Service, see C L Dunn, The emergency
medical services, London, HMSO, 1952–1953,
vol. 1.
16A Landsborough Thomson, Half a century of
medical research. Volume 2: The programme of the
Medical Research Council (UK), London, HMSO,
1975, p. 255.
17Linda Bryder, ‘Public health research and the
MRC’, in Austoker and Bryder (eds), op. cit., note 5
above, pp. 59–81.
18At least those of England, Wales and Northern
Ireland did—Scottish hospitals came under the
jurisdiction of the Scottish Secretary of State for
Health, a separate body but accountable to the British
Ministry of Health.
19A Landsborough Thomson to J E Pater, 27 May
1949, NA, MH 123/498.
20Ibid.
21Francis R Fraser, ‘The challenge to the medical
profession’, Br. med. J., 1960, ii: 1822–6.
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497government in 1942 to advise on post-war reconstruction, had come out strongly in
favour of a regional organization of teaching, service and research.
22 This model of
regionalization, structured around the major teaching hospitals and their affiliated uni-
versities, was at the heart of Bevan’s NHS. Thus the new NHS ushered in new institu-
tional opportunities for the pursuit of clinical academic medicine in Britain, and the
MRC, keen to capitalize on these changed circumstances, promoted a quite specific
vision of how that pursuit be best conducted.
In 1953 a Ministry of Health report, Clinical research in relation to the National
Health Service, announced the establishment of a Clinical Research Board (CRB), and
outlined the need for the new body:
clinical research ... needs to be organised on a United Kingdom basis. Such may range from
problems of basic clinical research to broad investigations of the applicability of a remedy or the
prevalence of an illness. We suggest that the central organisation could best promote clinical
research of this nature by adopting, on the model of the Medical Research Council’s practice,
the policy of giving research grants and setting up clinical research units.
23
According to the report, the CRB, or one of its sub-committees, would in future
assess large research grants and distribute resources according to “research priorities”
and the existence, or not, of similar projects. “Decentralized” research funded locally
by hospitals and local authorities was still allowed under this new regime, but these plans
too had to be submitted for approval by the Ministry of Health, in consultation with the
CRB.
24 In any case, the increasingly tight financial environment strongly affected the
culture of research, according to a 1956 government Treasury minute:
...the tightness of the hospitals’ allocations for hospital running costs and the shortage of funds for
development would ensure that money was not frivolously spent on research; there was no danger
of a re-expansion in areas where work would have been taken away by C.R.B. The removal of the
top research workers would of itself bring about a contraction.
25
In other words, the scarcity of resources within the NHS system in the 1950s created
the financial means to discipline hospital authorities into certain types of co-operation
with central authorities. Hospitals had fewer and fewer resources to devote to research;
by the mid-1950s the NHS was in the midst of a funding crisis affecting all its func-
tions.
26 Lack of money generated opportunities for greater intervention. For instance,
in a 1955 memo to the Chief Medical Officer, Sir John Charles, Harold Himsworth,
MRC Secretary from 1949 to 1968, was explicit about the mechanism for bringing aca-
demic units into line and up to standard, “What one envisages happening ...is that the
loose control now existing over salaried workers will be replaced by tight control based
on short-term grants.”
27
22Ministry of Health and Department of Health
for Scotland, Report of the inter-departmental
committee on medical schools, London, HMSO, 1944.
23Clinical research in relation to the
National Health Service, London, HMSO, 1953,
p. 7.
24NA, MH 123/499 contains examples of such
returns.
25Meeting between the MRC, Treasury and
Ministry, ‘Transfer of Clinical Research’, 10 Oct.
1956, NA, FD 7/241.
26Rivett, op. cit., note 13 above, ch. 2.
2726 Nov. 1955, NA, MH 123/498.
Helen Valier and Carsten Timmermann
498Thus the CRB, modelled on, organized by, and responsible to, the MRC offered an
unprecedented opportunity to realize Fletcher’s original dream of shaping the overall
direction of British biomedical research. In the next section we will look at clinical trials
to illustrate how the Council aimed, not always successfully, to change both research and
clinical practice along the lines of what its members viewed as good science.
Clinical Trials
Clinical researchers conceived of controlled trials long before they acquired the finan-
cial, institutional and organizational means to carry them out.
28 In Britain, the develop-
ment and marketing of insulin in the 1920s led to the creation in 1931 of an MRC
Therapeutic Trials Committee, designed, in co-ordination with the Association of British
Chemical Manufacturers, to speed up the process of making potentially useful synthetic
products into usable clinical products. Organizing large-scale co-operative trials and
gleaning good data proved extremely difficult in practice.
29 As discussed above, the
MRC’s endeavours to foster academic clinical research were severely constrained,
from its inception, by the lack of an effective inter-war university base in experimental
medicine.
30 Wartime exigencies changed this. In Britain as elsewhere, the Second World
War stimulated programmes of targeted academic research into everything from weap-
ons systems to public health.
31 The financial, institutional and organizational means
were at last being found for large-scale co-operative research in Britain.
In 1946 a team of British physicians, statisticians, bacteriologists, and radiologists
came together to form the Tuberculosis Chemotherapy Trials Committee of the MRC.
They began to organize what would be the world’s first randomized controlled clinical
trial.
32 Three major MRC centres were involved in the committee: the Tuberculosis
28Marks, op. cit., note 11 above; Edwards, op.
cit., note 3 above.
29The trials of “liver-extract” for pernicious
anaemia in the 1920s and 1930s, and patulin for the
common cold in the early 1940s were early attempts
by the MRC to co-ordinate rigorous trials. The “liver
extract” trials collapsed partly due to suspicions on
the part of senior Council figures that certain clinical
researchers were using the scheme for personal
benefit (Valier, op. cit., note 12 above, ch. 3). The
patulin trials, on the other hand, were significantly
more successful in terms of organization, but they did
not show the drug to be efficacious. Iain Chalmers
and Mike Clarke have argued that it was this lack of
efficacy that caused the trial to be virtually ignored as
the immediate model for the subsequent, much
celebrated, trials of streptomycin for tuberculosis. See
Iain Chalmers and Mike Clarke, ‘The 1944 patulin
trial: the first properly conducted multicentre trial
conducted under the aegis of the British Medical
Research Council’, Inter. J. Epidemiol., 2004, 33:
253–60.
30Christopher C Booth, ‘Clinical research’, in
Austoker and Bryder (eds), op. cit., note 5 above, pp.
205–41, p. 205. By the 1930s the academic clinical
research base sponsored by the MRC included
university hospitals and clinics in London, Sheffield,
Edinburgh and St Andrews, and the Surgical Unit at
The Welsh National School of Medicine, Cardiff, but
elsewhere MRC money was scarce.
31On the increase in funding of military-related
scientific research in Britain during the Second World
War, see, for example, Brian Balmer, Britain and
biological warfare: expert advice and science policy,
1930–1965, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001; David
Edgerton, Warfare state: Britain, 1920–1970,
Cambridge University Press, 2006; and Bryder,
op. cit., note 17 above.
32Medical Research Council, ‘Streptomycin
treatment of pulmonary tuberculosis’, Br. med. J.,
1948, 2: 769–82. For discussion of the MRC’s early
trial, see Lise Wilkinson, ‘Sir Austin Bradford Hill:
medical statistics and the quantitative approach to
disease’, Addiction, 1997, 92: 657–66; and
A Yoshioka, ‘Use of randomisation in the Medical
Research Council’s clinical trial of streptomycin in
pulmonary tuberculosis in the 1940s’, Br. med. J.,
1998, 317: 1220–3. Yoshioka questions the extent to
which the trial should be considered as truly novel in
this regard, and considers the wider social and
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499Research Unit at the MRC laboratories in Hampstead; the Institute for Diseases of the
Chest at the Brompton Hospital, London; and the Statistical Unit at the London School
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. The directors of these three centres, Philip D’Arcy
Hart, J G Scadding, and Austin Bradford Hill, respectively, directed the design of the
trial protocol, and oversaw the central collection and analysis of results from 100 physi-
cians across the UK. The trial compared a group of pulmonary tuberculosis patients
treated with bed-rest with a group prescribed bed-rest combined with the new American
antibiotic, streptomycin. When published in 1948, the results showed conclusively that
the drug did have therapeutic benefits over bed-rest alone; the trial was praised around
the world for the elegance of its planning and design, as well as for the far-reaching use-
fulness of its findings.
33 There were, however, certain unusual features of the trial design
that suited the particular case and led to its successful organization and execution, but
which were not easily reproducible in other contexts. Briefly, these were: a very specific
group of patients, and a relatively sophisticated monitoring technology.
The original trials committee worked with a carefully selected group of willing physi-
cians, all sharing considerable experience in the assessment and treatment of tuberculous
patients, and all eager to try out this new American therapy within the rigours of the
newly defined “clinical trial”. The choice to treat only a very specific type of tuberculo-
sis patient—one defined as “acute progressive bilateral pulmonary tuberculosis of pre-
sumably recent origin, bacteriologically proved, unsuitable for collapse therapy, age
group 15–25”
34 (that is, unsuitable for forms of therapy other than bed-rest)—meant
that random allocation to a “control” group (bed-rest only) was relatively unproblematic.
The fact that tuberculosis was commonly monitored radiographically gave the Commit-
tee and its researchers a means of central assessment, since all X-ray films were sub-
mitted to the trials Committee along with case reports. All this meant that the
Committee’s report in 1948, despite being based on only 100 patients, was confident
in its endorsement of streptomycin therapy as a great improvement on existing treat-
ments, albeit only for one specific, not very common, kind of tuberculosis. The report
urged immediate further research to determine the possible wider applicability of strep-
tomycin, and to investigate optimal dosage, ideal duration of treatment, and how to deal
with drug-resistant bacilli.
35
Fears over toxic effects and bacterial resistance soon brought controversy over
streptomycin, stimulating the trialling and introduction of PAS and isoniazid in the
early 1950s.
36 As these drugs were shown to be highly effective, subsequent trials did
not include, on ethical grounds, an “untreated” (bed-rest alone) group. Rather, clinical
trials for anti-tuberculosis therapy became complex networks comparing multiple
political context of centrally controlled
randomization. On the wider significance of
tuberculosis in post-Second World War Britain, see
Anne Hardy, ‘Reframing disease: changing
perceptions of tuberculosis in England and Wales,
1938–70’, Hist. Res., 2003, 76 (194): 535–56.
33As described in the summary reports of current
literature for the period carried by the British Medical
Annual: A Yearbook of Treatment and Practitioner’s
Index.
34Medical Research Council, op. cit., note 32
above, p. 770.
35Ibid., pp. 780–1.
36Ibid., pp. 769–70. Despite the various toxicity
scares surrounding streptomycin, and the hype and
“anti-hype” accompanying its testing phase (for
details see Yoshioka, op. cit., note 32 above), the
trial, none the less, recruited well and progressed
smoothly.
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500treatments—chemical, surgical, physical—in different combinations, often linked back
to the results of the “untreated” (i.e., bed-rest) cohort of the original trial.
37 An opportu-
nity for a simpler, potentially more conclusive, study came about in the mid-1950s, when
a major testing facility was established in the Indian city of Madras. This study was an
international endeavour, combining the efforts of the British Medical Research Council,
the World Health Organization, the government of Tamil Nadu and the Indian Council
for Medical Research.
38 The Madras trials sought to establish whether the use of chemo-
therapies could wholly remove the need for sanatorium care for tuberculosis, which
developing countries could ill-afford. The Madras trials showed that tuberculous patients
could be safely treated at home and with chemotherapy alone, and these results had pro-
found effects on both Indian and WHO policy. Back in Britain the trial did not, however,
eliminate prescriptions of bed-rest, followed by very long closely supervised courses of
therapy.
39 Although sanatorium care for the treatment of tuberculosis in the richer
nations fell with the declining domestic incidence of the disease, the new treatments
did not sweep away older forms of care. While chemotherapy became common during
the early to mid-1950s, surgery, sanatorium and bed-rest all remained prominent features
of the British approach to tuberculosis treatment.
40 The principles that underpinned sana-
torium care—fresh-air, rest and good nutrition—remained firmly implanted in the clini-
cal mind when dealing with tuberculous patients. Doctors in Britain were reluctant to
launch treatment trials using chemotherapy alone, especially for those cases in which
the disease was much advanced. When the Tuberculosis Society of Scotland launched
a major study in the late 1950s to investigate whether bed-rest added value to chemother-
apy treatment, or whether it could be dispensed with, only “highly co-operative” patients
with “mild forms” of the disease were chosen to participate.
41
We are not suggesting that the 1948 trials and the 1955 Madras trials did not produce
clear and convincing evidence—far from it. Rather, we suggest that the influence of trial
results on existing clinical practice was neither straightforward nor uncontested, even in
the presence of supposedly overwhelming evidence. It is clear that the streptomycin trials
led to a widespread uptake of the RCT as an effective means to determine and compare
therapeutic efficacy, but protocol design was an increasingly complex and contentious
matter, as was the translation of trial findings into practice. The special circumstances
37This notion of “linking” trials is discussed by J
G Scadding, ‘Clinical aspects of controlled trials in
pulmonary tuberculosis’, in Controlled clinical trials,
Oxford, Blackwell, 1960, pp. 52–6.
38Sunil Amrith, ‘In search of a “magic bullet” for
tuberculosis: South India and beyond, 1955–1965’,
Soc. Hist. Med., 2004, 17: 113–30; H Valier, ‘At
home in the colonies: the WHO–MRC trials at the
Madras Chemotherapy Centre in the 1950s and
1960s’, in M Worboys and F Condrau (eds),
Tuberculosis then and now: interdisciplinary
perspectives on a post-modern plague, Montreal,
McGill-Queens University Press, forthcoming.
39A 1961 report by the British Tuberculosis
Association recommended long term supervision,
possibly life-long supervision, of all patients treated
with chemotherapy for their tuberculosis. See
‘Relapse in pulmonary tuberculosis: an analysis of the
fate of patients notified in 1947, 1951 and 1954.
Report from the Association’s Research Committee’,
Tubercle, 1961, 42, 178–86.
40James L Livingstone, ‘Observations on the
treatment of pulmonary tuberculosis at the present
time’, Br. med. J., 1955, i: 243–50.
41D T Kay, ‘The treatment of pulmonary
tuberculosis at work: a controlled trial. An interim
report by the Research Committee of the Tuberculosis
Society of Scotland’, Tubercle, 1957, 38: 375–81;
Report from the Research Committee of the
Tuberculosis Society of Scotland, ‘The treatment of
pulmonary tuberculosis at work: a controlled trial’,
Tubercle, 1960, 41: 161–70.
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501of the 1948 and 1955 trials were not commonly found in clinical practice, so the fact that
the RCT went from strength to strength on the clinical research scene from the 1950s
onwards, suggests a strong relationship between this form of knowledge formation and
organization and the emerging institutional infrastructure of clinical research. We there-
fore propose that epistemological success alone did not create RCTs as the axis of clin-
ical research in the late 1950s, but rather that the technique was co-produced within the
new political and organizational infrastructure of post-war British medicine, which itself
was expected to benefit from the existence of the controlled trial.
42
The case study on the MRC lung cancer therapy trials shows this more clearly. If the
MRC could bring cancer research—with its diverse sources of funding, multiple sites of
excellence, high public and political profile, and variously industrial, academic, clinical,
and charity research agenda and modus operandi—under its own control, then it would
have established a precedent for MRC co-ordination across the whole range of biomedi-
cal research spaces in the UK. The territory of cancer research was far from empty, and
any MRC claims on it were stridently contested during the first part of the twentieth cen-
tury. Cancer research offered the kind of close connections between the bench-side and
bedside to which Fletcher and his colleagues aspired, but their approach was not wel-
comed by some senior practising clinicians, who had a more sceptical outlook on the
claims of bioscience.
43 In cancer research such conflict and reshaping was especially
visible where, aside from local (hospital endowment funds) and MRC efforts, two large
and well-funded clinician-led charities operated: the Imperial Cancer Research Fund
(ICRF, founded in 1902) and the British Empire Cancer Campaign (BECC, founded in
1923).
44 Clinicians and scientists interested in cancer already had the resources of these
charities and of cancer centres such as the Marsden and Christie hospitals in London and
Manchester to draw upon. Across the nation’s hospitals, local interests and practices had
grown up around cancer, and these too proved difficult for the MRC to manage until
after the introduction of the NHS in 1948.
Cancer therapy trials, like the ongoing tuberculosis trials, were emblematic of the pro-
blems emerging within co-operative trial groups during the late 1950s. Researchers
increasingly faced the prospect of testing therapies for complicated, chronic ailments
for which there already existed multiple treatments, and for which the effects of new
therapeutics were often highly contested. Unlike tuberculosis, however, with its suc-
cesses in combination chemotherapy and the short-course chemotherapy regimes devel-
oped in the 1970s,
45 cancer trials often delivered at best marginal benefits, with
42Here we are using “co-produced” in the sense
outlined by Sheila Jasanoff in the introductory essay
to Sheila Jasanoff (ed.), States of knowledge: the co-
production of science and social order, London,
Routledge, 2004, especially p. 6.
43Joan Austoker, A history of the Imperial Cancer
Research Fund, 1902–1986, Oxford University Press,
1988, pp. 73–6.
44Austoker provides an excellent summary of
these complex and shifting relationships, ibid.,
pp. 139–204. She argues that even in the early years
of Fletcher’s secretaryship, he had been determined to
see all medical research in the UK come under the
jurisdiction of the MRC. He therefore objected both
to the (clinician-led) British Empire Cancer
Campaign’s refusal to co-operate in the
administration of funds for cancer research, and the
Ministry of Health’s own planned programme of
research. Arguments over the Ministry’s cancer
research initiative were a significant aspect of the
drawing up of the 1924 concordat, in order that
Fletcher and the Chief Medical Officer of Health,
George Newman, might clarify their specific,
respective fields of influence.
45See D A Christie and E M Tansey (eds), Short-
course chemotherapy for tuberculosis, London,
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502endpoints more controversial and success more difficult to assess. As such, they make an
excellent counter-example to the tuberculosis case. As we will demonstrate, the complex
and contested data derived from these ever more complex and formal trials, along with
rows over design and execution, became ever more common. Nevertheless, such contro-
versy did not undermine the progress of the clinical trial as an increasingly essential fea-
ture of clinical-biomedical research. Why this should have been the case is, we argue,
as much a question of the politics as of the content of British clinical research. The
co-operative clinical trial both constructed and maintained new forms of organization
and relationships in academic medicine.
On 31 January 1957, the MRC held a conference on the evaluation of different
methods of cancer therapy. The organization of the conference was itself very much a
product of the age. Following the publication of a report by the MRC’s Committee on
the Clinical Applications of Nuclear Physics on supervoltage radiotherapy, the CRB
had recommended that this new technology, along with other cancer therapies, should
be investigated in large clinical populations under the auspices of the MRC.
46 The chair-
man of the Committee on the Clinical Applications of Nuclear Physics, Brian Windeyer,
also chaired the conference. Windeyer, professor of radiotherapy at the Middlesex
Hospital Medical School, belonged to a generation of medical academics that actively
shaped the post-war reorganization of both cancer services and medical research. He
recommended to the conference that the MRC “should consider undertaking an investi-
gation into the treatment of certain tumours which appeared particularly suitable for
short-term study”.
47 The resulting agenda set by the recommendations of the 1957
conference was heavily geared towards the evaluation of the new radiotherapy
machines.
48 Following the preliminary findings reported by the Committee on the Clin-
ical Applications of Nuclear Physics, the conference participants expected positive and
convincing results.
49 Radiotherapy appeared to be the form of treatment from which
these British cancer specialists expected most innovative impulses.
50 This was perhaps
not surprising, given the strength of the field in Britain, the role that the MRC had played
in the distribution of radium in the inter-war period, and the strong presence of promi-
nent radiotherapists at the conference.
51 Cancer chemotherapy, by contrast, was in its
infancy, and beyond the networks surrounding the Chester Beatty Institute in London
Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at
UCL, 2005.
46‘The value of supervoltage therapy in the one
to ten MeV range’, NA, FD 7/698; ‘Informal
Conference on the Evaluation of Different Methods
of Cancer Therapy’, invitation, ibid.
47‘Evaluation of different methods of cancer
therapy: recommendations of the Council’s steering
committee’, NA, FD 7/327. The other participants,
besides Windeyer were: P Armitage, D Baird,
J Bruce, S Cade, Lord Cohen, D A G Galton
(representing A Haddow), G Hadfield, A Bradford
Hill, G Jefferson, R McWhirter, P R Peacock, R Platt,
R Paterson, R W Scarff and L J Witts, as well as
F J C Herrald and M Gorrill from MRC Headquarters.
Invited but unable to attend were C Dodds, A Haddow,
J S Mitchell, F G Spear and D W Smithers.
48‘Evaluation of dfferent methods of cancer
therapy: recommendations of the Council’s steering
committee’, NA, FD 7/327.
49‘The value of supervoltage therapy in the one
to ten MeV range’, NA, FD 7/698.
50E Toon, ‘Does bigger mean better? British
perspectives on American cancer treatment and
research, 1948’, J. Clin. Oncol., 2007, 25: 5831–34.
51For the history of radiotherapy in Britain, see
C C S Murphy, ‘A history of radiotherapy to 1950:
cancer and radiotherapy in Britain 1850–1950’, PhD
dissertation, University of Manchester, 1986. See also
David Cantor, ‘The MRC’s support for experimental
radiology during the inter-war years’, in Austoker
and Bryder (eds), op. cit., note 5 above, pp. 181–204.
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503and the Christie Hospital in Manchester, British cancer specialists showed little interest
in it.
52
In June 1957, the Council appointed a steering committee, also chaired by Windeyer,
to prepare the appropriate cancer trials.
53 The steering committee then appointed five ad
hoc working parties for the chosen forms of cancer—carcinoma of the bronchus, oeso-
phagus, bladder, bone sarcoma, and medulloblastoma—to assist with the task of
“drawing up a co-ordinated scheme of investigation”.
54 The plans of the steering com-
mittee did not meet with anything like the enthusiasm they had hoped for. Three of
the working parties were disbanded in short order: the carcinoma of the oesophagus
working party (chairman: D F Campbell) immediately after its first meeting, when its
members agreed that the envisaged trial of radiotherapy versus surgery should not be
attempted. The carcinoma of the bladder (chairman: R B Hunter) and medulloblastoma
(chairman: Dorothy Russell) working parties both terminated in 1962. The bladder can-
cer group did not manage to recruit enough patients fulfilling the criteria for admission
for the trial they were hoping to undertake; and subsequent proposals were all deemed
impracticable. The medulloblastoma group gave up when they found, after undertaking
retrospective studies, that comparable cases treated with usual procedures in different
centres could not be matched in order to obtain a statistically significant evaluation of
the results of treatment. Only the carcinoma of the bronchus (chairman: J G Scadding)
and bone sarcoma (chairman: Herbert Seddon) working parties survived into the early
1970s, by which time the MRC had fundamentally reorganized its activities in cancer
research, partly due to generational change, leading to a turn towards chemotherapy.
55
Keating and Cambrosio have argued that the protocol-driven approach of chemo-
therapy trials represented a new “style of practice”, or “a distinctive configuration of
institutions, scientific practices, and materials that [generated] specific ways of identify-
ing and investigating research questions, of producing and assessing results, and of regu-
lating these activities”.
56 And it was the sixth chemotherapy-focused working party,
appointed in 1955 under Leslie Witts to work on leukaemia, that fared the best of all.
The working party carried out a number of trials in leukaemia and myelomatosis, and
in 1968 was reconstituted as an independent, permanent Council committee. The fact
that there were such differences in the fortunes of the working parties suggests that the
styles of practice inherent in RCTs worked best in those fields where existing therapies
were weak or non-existent. In the remainder of this paper we will focus on the lung
cancer studies, carried out by the tuberculosis research unit that so successfully orga-
nized the streptomycin and Madras trials, since they illustrate more of the problems
that the Council faced when using clinical trials as a means of colonizing fields of
research where the MRC had historically had little influence.
52‘Alexander Haddow’, Biog. Mem. Fellows R.
Soc., 1977, 23: 133–91, especially pp. 153–60.
53The members of the steering committee were:
B W Windeyer (chairman), J S Mitchell, R B Hunter,
R E Scarff, A L d’Abreu, J Gough, A Bradford Hill
and L J Witts.
54‘Evaluation of different methods of cancer
therapy: recommendations of the Council’s steering
committee’, NA, FD 7/327.
55‘Evaluation of different methods of Cancer
Therapy Committee’, NA, FD 7/340.
56Peter Keating and Alberto Cambrosio, ‘Cancer
clinical trials: the emergence and development of a
new style of practice’, Bull. Hist. Med., 2007, 81:
197–223, on p. 199.
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504The composition of each working party had followed the same basic design: each
included a physician, a surgeon, a pathologist, and a radiotherapist, most of whom had
had previous links to the MRC. In addition, Bradford Hill, representing the Council’s
statistical tradition, was an omnipresent factor to all. With the proposals of the working
parties in hand, the committee recommended that suitable trials should not require “too
elaborate an organisation” while carrying a “reasonable promise of yielding useful
information”, and that random allocation, while not essential, should be attempted.
57
The timing, with the results of a number of conventional trials already published or about
to be published, as well as the subsequent discussions within the working parties,
suggests that the use of the new randomized trial approach may have had priority over
the development of new therapeutic techniques. The late 1950s was a time when MRC
committees of this type did begin to seek ways to standardize activities and bring all
researchers up to a level of agreed best practice. The Evaluation of Cancer Therapy
Committee was thus a vehicle for emphasizing the innovative approach of the RCT
not only in the evaluation of new therapeutic methods, but also in the rigorous analysis
of well-established methods of practice (in this case in surgery and radiotherapy).
Although such a process had an obvious appeal within a cash-strapped, socialized
health-care system, changes in actual clinical practice, as in the aftermath of the Madras
trials, were not easily effected.
The discussions in the working parties centred predominantly on the type of studies
that were both technically and ethically feasible.
58 It became clear that it was not easy
to find suitable, well-contained questions that could be answered by an ethically
acceptable clinical trial, within the remits set by the original 1957 conference recom-
mendations: promising, reasonably easy to organize, using randomization, and leading
to further research.
59 For lung cancer, Scadding, a veteran of the MRC tuberculosis trials
at home and abroad, suggested three problems that might fit with the recommendations
and were worth studying: first, the efficacy of surgery as opposed to radiotherapy,
“which was as yet an unsolved question”; second, the efficacy of different kinds of radio-
therapy; and third, the use of chemotherapy alone or in combinations with other forms of
treatment.
60 However, he did not believe that there was satisfactory evidence for the
beneficial effects of chemotherapy, and therefore he did not think that an evaluation of
its use was a suitable subject. There were also, he argued, considerable ethical objections
to a comparison of surgery and radiotherapy, as about a quarter of the patients under-
going surgery survived for five years or longer.
61 The Working Party settled on the
idea of a trial comparing the effects of super- and ortho-voltage irradiation. It
was decided to approach D’Arcy Hart at the MRC’s Tuberculosis Research Unit about
57‘Evaluation of different methods of cancer
therapy: recommendations of the Council’s steering
committee’, NA, FD 7/327.
58For a more detailed account of these
discussions and the trials, see Carsten Timmermann,
‘As depressing as it was predictable? Lung cancer,
clinical trials, and the Medical Research Council in
postwar Britain’, Bull. Hist Med., 2007, 81: 312–34.
59Minutes of the steering committee meeting on
13 Jan.1958, NA, FD 7/327; Minutes of the meeting
of the Lung Cancer Working Party on 24 June 1958,
ibid.
60Ibid.
61Ibid.
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505co-ordinating the work in collaboration with the Statistical Unit, since these units had
previous experience with controlled trials.
62 D’Arcy Hart, although initially reluctant
because of staff shortages in his unit, eventually agreed to assist his long-time collea-
gues.
63
The next difficulty the working party faced was considerably more tricky: how to per-
suade enough potential collaborators around the country of the value of the planned
study. Letters were written to centres that the Working Party considered likely partici-
pants, and a crucial meeting was prepared with twenty-nine consultant radiotherapists.
It became clear during this meeting, which took place on 21 January 1961, that the radio-
therapists were not enthusiastic about the protocol. Most thought that super-voltage was
“obviously” preferable to ortho-voltage therapy and they were not convinced that a trial
made sense.
64 Many suggested, instead, that a trial should be designed to “compare the
progress and survival rate of patients with presumed undifferentiated carcinomas of the
lung following surgical treatment, with that following radiotherapy”.
65 Faced with the
prospect of a trial in which the leading radiotherapists were unwilling to participate,
the organizers returned to the drawing board. Another consultation meeting was sched-
uled with both consultant surgeons and radiotherapists on 25 July 1961.
66 Scadding
introduced the agenda by stating that “there appeared to be a clinical problem as to the
right advice to give a patient with a histological report of an undifferentiated carcinoma
of the bronchus—whether to advise surgery or radical radiotherapy”.
67 Defining the pro-
blem in this way helped to overcome ethical problems, and discussion with the surgeons
indicated that there was indeed disagreement among them. While some saw it as
“proven” that resection, where possible, was always superior to other forms of treatment,
others argued that for this type of tumour it was time to move away from surgical treat-
ment as the results were uniformly poor, and turn to radiotherapy or chemotherapy.
Finally the Working Party returned to an option for a trial design that its members had
dismissed at an earlier stage of the discussion, but now with a specific focus on anaplas-
tic or undifferentiated carcinoma of the lung.
68 Restricting eligibility on grounds of the
histological characteristics of the tumour had made feasible a study that originally was
unacceptable on ethical grounds.
The results of the trial were disappointing. After two years, only three of the original
seventy-one surgical patients and ten of the seventy-three radiotherapy patients were still
alive. According to the report in the Lancet,
The number of survivors at 24 months is so small that further statistically significant differences
between the series in this respect cannot now arise. Despite the slightly higher proportion of
short-term and long-term survivors in the radical radiotherapy series both policies have produced
62Memorandum, 8 Oct. 1959, NA,
FD 7/327.
63D’Arcy Hart to Gorrill, 15 March 1960, NA,
FD 23/1163.
64Ibid. and Draft Memorandum, n.d., NA,
FD 7/327.
65Ibid.
66Minutes of a Special Meeting with Consultant
Surgeons and Radiotherapists, 25 July 1961, NA,
FD 7/327
67Ibid.
68Another option considered and later apparently
dropped was a trial in the fractionization of doses. See
ibid. and Draft Memorandum, n.d., NA, FD 7/327.
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506very poor results in this highly malignant form of carcinoma, confirming the findings in other
series.
69
The working party suggested that radiotherapy might be the slightly better choice, as
post-operative complications would be avoided. Follow-up for the thirteen survivors con-
tinued as planned. After five years, only one surgery patient and three in the radiotherapy
group were alive. After ten years this surgery patient had also died. In fact, while origin-
ally assigned to the surgery group, he had become too breathless to withstand an opera-
tion and received palliative radiotherapy instead (he was not the only member of this
group who turned out to be inoperable when surgery was scheduled). The three survivors
in the radiotherapy group were still alive after ten years.
70 A handwritten note in the
administrative file dealing with the study states: “It seems to me that there is nothing
at all controversial about this report, which is a straightforward account of a difficult
but well organized clinical trial, the outcome of which has been as depressing as it
was predictable.”
71 More depressingly, a letter debate in the Lancet following the publi-
cation of the results indicates that thoracic surgeons were not convinced that the trial had
conclusively shown that radiotherapy was superior in this form of lung cancer.
72 The
Working Party had demonstrated that they could organize a trial in difficult circum-
stances, but had failed to turn this organizational triumph into any particularly useful
knowledge.
The second trial initiated by the Working Party was more promising, as the question
addressed was not as fundamental as the decision between surgery, a well established
form of therapy, and radiotherapy, which in this form of cancer had so far not yielded
particularly good results. This second trial, which started in 1964, was a study of chemo-
therapy as an adjuvant to surgery. Again, this was organized by the MRC Tuberculosis
Research Unit.
73 The preparation of the chemotherapy trial, it seems, was much
smoother than in the first trial. There were no extensive debates within the Working
Party and no big meetings with consultants were scheduled. One explanation for this
lack of controversy may be that chemotherapy was tested only as a secondary therapy,
an adjunct to surgery, to prevent the growth of secondary tumours. Moreover, radio-
therapy was well established in Britain, while chemotherapy was perceived as something
new—an approach that promised new channels for intervention.
74 In this trial patients
69J G Scadding, J R Bignall, L G Blair,
W P Cleland, et al., ‘Comparative trial of surgery
and radiotherapy for the primary treatment of small-
celled or oat-celled carcinoma of the bronchus: first
report to the Medical Research Council by the
Working-Party on the Evaluation of Different
Methods of Therapy in Carcinoma of the Bronchus’,
Lancet, 1966, ii: 979–86, on p. 984.
70A B Miller, Wallace Fox, and Ruth Tall, ‘Five-
year follow-up of the Medical Research Council
Comparative Trial of Surgery and Radiotherapy for
the Primary Treatment of Small-Celled or Oat-Celled
Carcinoma of the Bronchus. A report to the Medical
Research Council Working Party on the Evaluation of
Different Methods of Therapy in Carcinoma of the
Bronchus’, Lancet, 1969, ii: 501–5; Wallace Fox and
J G Scadding, ‘Medical Research Council
comparative trial of surgery and radiotherapy for
primary treatment of small-celled or oat-celled
carcinoma of bronchus: ten-year follow-up’, Lancet,
1973, ii: 63–5.
71Note by J R H [Herrald], 22 August 1966, NA,
FD 7/1151.
72See, for example, R Abbey Smith, ‘Treatment
of bronchial carcinoma’, Lancet, 1966, ii: 1134–5,
and J R Belcher, ‘Treatment of bronchial carcinoma’,
Lancet, 1966, ii: 1190–1.
73NA, FD 7/327; FD 23/1163.
74For critical remarks on studies undertaken with
chemotherapy in lung cancer from France, the US
and Denmark, see L Israel, ‘Chemotherapy in
inoperable bronchial carcinoma’, Lancet, 1971,
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507were randomly assigned, in a double-blind set-up, to groups that were prescribed either
one of two chemotherapeutic agents, busulphan or cyclophosphamide, or a placebo.
75
Recruitment and organization went very smoothly, and there were few complications.
While the Working Group had now shown that it was able to organize a clinical trial
in lung cancer that conformed to the new standards of a co-operative, double-blind, ran-
domized controlled trial, the results did not fulfil their expectations: “The therapeutic
results at two years are disappointing, for there is no evidence that either of the two cyto-
toxic drugs in the dosage used improved survival”.
76 After five years, 27 per cent of the
patients who received cyclophosphamide were still alive, 28 per cent of those on busul-
phan, and 34 per cent in the placebo group. As with the first trial, these were disappoint-
ing results, and this disappointment contributed to a negative atmosphere surrounding the
disease. Lung cancer was turning into a “Cinderella cancer”. In the absence of hope or
cures from biomedicine, its increasing incidence was often blamed on the patients them-
selves, the majority of whom were and are smokers or ex-smokers.
77
Conclusion
The case of cancer research shows that while it was tempting to use controlled clinical
trials as part of a programme of reorganization and standardization, trial organizers
faced many problems in implementing their ambitious schemes and recruiting collabora-
tors. In most cases, the results were less clear than for streptomycin and tuberculosis, and
even there, as we have seen, the reality was more ambiguous than commentators today
generally assume. The main success story of post-war clinical cancer research, as is
well known, has not been in the treatment of solid cancers such as those of the lung,
but in leukaemias and lymphomas, especially in children.
78 We might want to suggest
here, though, that the notion of childhood leukaemia as a curable disease emerged in
spite of the results of early treatment trials which, on the surface, did not seem to give
reason for significantly greater hopes than those for solid cancers. Only in the 1970s
did the notion of temporary remission give way to that of cure.
79 To understand these
different histories, it is important to look both at the results of trials and at the institu-
tional and cognitive contexts, the involvement of medical disciplines and the status of
allied sciences, the charities and agencies that promoted research into particular forms
of malignant disease, and, not least, the role of public campaigns and public images.
In this context it cannot be ignored that with increasing acceptance of the link
between lung cancer and cigarette smoking since the late 1950s, middle-aged smokers
i: 971–2; Franco M Muggia, Heine H Hansen, and Per
Dombernowsky, ‘Treatment of small-cell carcinoma
of bronchus’, Lancet, 1975, 1: 692.
75MRC Working Party, ‘Study of cytotoxic
chemotherapy as an adjuvant to surgery in carcinoma
of the bronchus’, Br. med. J., 1971, 2: 421–8; H Stott,
R J Stephens, W Fox, and D C Roy, ‘5-year follow-up
of cytotoxic chemotherapy as an adjuvant to surgery
in carcinoma of the bronchus’, Br. J. Cancer, 1976,
34: 167–73.
76MRC Working Party, op. cit., note 75 above,
p. 427.
77Ray Donnelly, Cinderella cancer: a personal
history of the Roy Castle Lung Cancer Foundation,
Liverpool, Bluecoat Press, 2006.
78For a celebration of this success, see James Le
Fanu, The rise and fall of modern medicine, London,
Little, Brown, 1999, pp. 138–56.
79G M Krueger, ‘“A cure is near”: children,
families, and cancer in America, 1945–1980’, PhD
dissertation, Yale University, 2003.
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508have been viewed by many as less deserving of great curative efforts than young
children.
80 We have aimed to demonstrate with this paper that the cognitive, ethical,
administrative and cultural aspects of post-war clinical research are nearly impossible
to separate. One central reason for this was the existence of established institutions
and practices, some already dedicated to cancer and others not, which shaped the local
culture of clinical cancer research in the UK.
One of the new technologies that changed the face of clinical research was the clinical
trial. The meaning of clinical trials has changed significantly since the 1950s, when the
MRC found it practicable to organize its anti-tuberculosis chemotherapy trials in Madras
in order to try to circumvent entrenched British practice.
81 Arguably this is a conse-
quence of repeated reports on hopes associated with new experimental treatments since
the 1960s (especially for childhood cancers) and the rigorous promotion of the rando-
mized controlled trial as the gold standard of modern clinical research. No longer are
participants in clinical trials viewed as “human guinea pigs” who above all need protec-
tion.
82 The number of clinical trials has become a marker for the status of a malignant
disease, designating it as potentially curable, and participation in a clinical trial has
turned into a symbol of hope for patients. Lung cancer patients in the 1970s and 1980s
were significantly under-represented in clinical trials. More recently, this has begun to
change. Expressions of this change can be found in publications that aim to re-frame
lung cancer as a potentially treatable disease rather than one that can only be pre-
vented.
83 In Britain, also, in the last few years, the Roy Castle Foundation has funded
a number of studies on lung cancer.
84
The early lung cancer trials we examined in this paper were not very successful in that
they did not create the hopes for cure and survival that are so important for the public
image of biomedicine. But how successful, more generally, were MRC attempts to
turn British cancer medicine into biomedicine? It is difficult to judge the role of the
Council separately from more general trends in medical research. The international
model in cancer medicine increasingly became American, especially following Richard
Nixon’s declaration of a “War on Cancer” in 1971. However, it is clear that in Britain
the MRC assumed an early central role in overseeing, organizing and funding clinical
trials, especially randomized controlled trials, to create a distinctively British model
embedded in a socialized healthcare system. Today, the Council’s Oxford Clinical Trials
Unit (CTU) is almost wholly dedicated to this technology, and much of its work deals
with cancer. The unit names the Tuberculosis Research Unit (later Tuberculosis
and Chest Diseases Unit) as one of its precursors.
85 Its reputation rests partly on the
80 Timmermann, op. cit., note 58 above.
81 Valier, op. cit., note 38 above.
82 One of the main promoters of the German
national centre for cancer research in Heidelberg,
Karl Heinrich Bauer, for example, in 1958 argued
against the term “cancer research” in the name of the
new centre as this would give potential patients the
idea that they might be experimented upon. See
Gustav Wagner and Andrea Mauerberger,
Krebsforschung in Deutschland: Vorgeschichte und
Geschichte des Deutschen Krebsforschungszentrums,
Berlin, Springer, 1989, p. 74.
83 See, for example, Claudia I Henschke and
Peggy McCarthy, Lung cancer: myths, facts, choices,
New York, Norton, 2002.
84 Donnelly, op. cit., note 77 above. See also
http://www.roycastle.org/ research/index.htm,
accessed on 18 April 2008.
85‘CTU History’, http://www.ctu.mrc.ac.uk/
History.asp, accessed on 18 April 2008.
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509involvement of its senior scientific staff in the follow-up studies on smoking and
health,
86 and on the work of the Cochrane Collaboration, which also had MRC roots.
Thus despite the wide range of agencies that now conduct and co-ordinate clinical
research in the UK, the initial central role of the MRC in this segment of clinical research
has left a legacy. The British biomedical scene was and is diverse in its funding, activ-
ities, and leaders, but the post-war MRC ensured that almost all these entities would
have to come into contact through a vast proliferation of standing committees, working
parties and similar bodies from the 1950s onwards. For better or worse, this unification
of multiple factions was a highly significant feature of post-war British biomedicine.
86 Sir Richard Doll, for example, was one of the
speakers at an event held in the premises of the Royal
College of Physicians in 2004 to celebrate sixty
years of MRC clinical research, where, with Richard
Peto, he presented the results of fifty years follow-up
in the ‘Doctors Study’: Richard Doll and A Bradford
Hill, ‘The mortality of doctors in relation to their
smoking habits: a preliminary report’, Br. med. J.,
1954, i: 1451–5.
Helen Valier and Carsten Timmermann
510